Model Predictive Control-Based Battery Scheduling and Incentives to
  Manipulate Demand Response Baselines by Ellman, Douglas & Xiao, Yuanzhang
Model Predictive Control-Based Battery Scheduling and Incentives
to Manipulate Demand Response Baselines
Douglas Ellman and Yuanzhang Xiao
Abstract—We study operations of a battery energy storage
system under a baseline-based demand response (DR) program
with an uncertain schedule of DR events. Baseline-based DR
programs may provide undesired incentives to inflate baseline
consumption in non-event days, in order to increase “apparent”
DR reduction in event days and secure higher DR payments. Our
goal is to identify and quantify such incentives. To understand
customer decisions, we formulate the problem of determining
hourly battery charging and discharge schedules to minimize
expected net costs, defined as energy purchase costs minus
energy export rebates and DR payments, over a sufficiently long
time horizon (e.g., a year). The complexity of this stochastic
optimization problem grows exponentially with the time horizon
considered. To obtain computationally tractable solutions, we
propose using multistage model predictive control with scenario
sampling. Numerical results indicate that our solutions are
near optimal (e.g., within 3% from the optimum in the test
cases). Finally, we apply our solutions to study an example
residential customer with solar photovoltaic and battery systems
participating in a typical existing baseline-based DR program.
Results reveal that over 66% of the average apparent load
reduction during DR events could result from inflation of baseline
consumption during non-event days.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important mechanism for improving reliability and re-
ducing costs of the power grid is demand response (DR).
Among the various DR mechanisms that have been proposed
or implemented [1] [2], we can categorize most of them
as price-based DR and incentive-based DR. Price-based DR
uses time-varying electricity prices to encourage customers
to reduce consumption when prices are high. Alternatively,
incentive-based DR pays customers rebates based on partici-
pation or performance in the DR program.
This paper focuses on baseline-based DR [3]–[11], an
important and widely-used class of incentive-based DR.
Baseline-based DR is prevalent in practice, because it can
be an opt-in program without changing customer electricity
rates, thus making it easier to achieve regulatory approval.
Baseline-based DR pays customers based on the difference
between energy consumption during DR events and baseline
consumption (e.g., average consumption during previous non-
event days).
While baseline-based DR gives customers incentives to
reduce load during DR events, it may also create undesired
incentives for customers to manipulate baselines. Randomized
control trials [12] and legal settlements [13] have provided
real-world evidence that customers may manipulate baselines.
In the past, manipulating DR baselines may have required
substantial customer effort or diminished customer comfort
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(e.g., manually changing air conditioner settings). But today,
battery systems with automated controllers can optimize cus-
tomer load profiles to maximize DR revenues with minimal
customer effort and discomfort. Thus, customers with batter-
ies may automatically use sophisticated strategies to exploit
incentives to manipulate baseline load, perhaps without being
aware that they are doing so. These behaviors may cause
the utility to make significant errors in projecting demand
forecasts, required DR quantities, and DR costs. Therefore,
it is important to identify such behaviors and quantify their
impacts.
To identify and quantify incentives to manipulate base-
lines, we need to understand how the customer schedules
hourly battery charging and discharging when participating
in baseline-based DR programs over a sufficiently long time
horizon (e.g., a year), facing the uncertainty in when will
the DR events occur. We model the customer’s decisions as
solutions to a stochastic optimization problem of minimizing
the expected net costs, defined as the energy purchase costs
minus energy export payments and DR payments. However,
the stochastic optimization problem is intractable to solve,
because its complexity grows exponentially with the time
horizon. We propose a multistage model predictive control
(MPC) approach, which determines the battery schedule of
each day by solving a stochastic program over a much shorter
receding horizon (e.g., a month). Through simulations, we
demonstrate that our proposed solutions are near optimal (e.g.,
within 3% from the optimum in the test cases). Then we
apply our solutions to study an example residential customer
with solar photovoltaic and battery systems participating in a
typical existing baseline-based DR program. Results indicate
that over 66% of the average apparent load reduction during
DR events could result from inflation of baseline consumption
during non-event days.
We summarize our major contributions as follows:
• our work is the first to study incentives to manipulate DR
baselines by using a battery;
• our work introduces a stochastic optimization problem
formulation, which is general enough to model a variety
of baseline-based DR mechanisms over a long time
horizon with uncertain DR event schedules;
• our work proposes a computationally-tractable and near-
optimal solution to the problem formulated, which allows
us to identify and quantify customer incentives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II discusses related work, Section III describes the problem,
Section IV describes our solution, Section V describes a
numerical case study for an example Honolulu residential
customer, and Section VI summarizes conclusions.
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II. RELATED WORK
There is a huge literature on optimal battery dispatch under
price-based DR (see some representative works in [14]–[18]).
Some of these works use solution concepts similar to ours,
namely stochastic programming and model-predictive control.
However, since baselines are not part of price-based DR, these
works do not study incentives to game baselines.
Some works study optimal battery dispatch under baseline-
based DR, but use pre-established baselines as inputs to their
models [9]–[11]. These works essentially assume that the
customer does not have the ability to manipulate the baseline,
and therefore do not study incentives to game baselines.
Many of the works that study gaming behavior focus
on mechanism design of the DR program [3]–[6]. In [4]–
[6], customers self-report baselines, and truthful reporting is
encouraged by excluding a subset of customers from each
event, and imposing penalties for deviations from reported
baselines for those non-participating customers. In [3], there
is a profit-sharing mechanism designed to discourage manip-
ulating baselines for a DR program in which the baseline is
the load at the start of the DR event. These works propose
new DR mechanisms and do not model battery operations.
In contrast, our work studies optimal battery operations under
more commonly used existing DR mechanisms.
The most related works are [7] [8], which study gaming
incentives in baseline-based DR. The work in [7] only includes
results for a two-stage model, where the second stage is the
event day with certainty. In comparison, our work considers
uncertain event schedules over many days. Our prior work [8]
studies a multi-day DR season with uncertain DR event sched-
ules. It uses dynamic programming with backwards induction
to obtain optimal energy consumption during DR windows of
event and non-event days, where there is a discrete set of daily
feasible consumption levels and the costs of realizing those
consumption levels are known and independent of actions on
other days. In contrast, our current work considers a battery
system, where the feasible hourly charging and discharging
quantities and associated opportunity costs depend on actions
taken at other times, and the action space is continuous. We
use model predictive control (MPC) to get a near-optimal
battery dispatch, because the complexity of the model in [8]
grows polynomially with the granularity of the discretization
of inherently continuous action and state spaces, while our
MPC approach allows continuous states and actions for free.
Additionally, this work adds representation of DR mechanisms
where payments depend on average power (kW) reduction
over multiple events (DR capacity payments). DR capacity
payments could not be easily considered by the model in [8]
because it would require significantly enlarging the state space
to include information about prior events.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Model Setup
We consider a customer with electric loads, a solar pho-
tovoltaic system, and a battery energy storage system. The
customer participates in a baseline-based demand response
program and is subject to a certain electricity tariff. We look
at a finite horizon of T days, where each day is indexed by
t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Due to the structure of the DR payments, these
T days are divided into I intervals (e.g., 12 months). The time-
granularity of the battery charging and discharging decisions
considered here is one hour, where each hour is indexed by
h ∈ {1, . . . ,H = 24 · T}. As will be useful later, we write
ti as the final day of each interval i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, and ht
as the final hour of each day t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Our objective
is to determine the optimal schedule of battery charging and
discharging in each hour to minimize the expected total net
cost for the customer over the T days.
The demand response program aims to incentivize the cus-
tomer to reduce electricity consumption during a pre-specified
window of hours (e.g., 5 p.m – 9 p.m.) on demand response
event days. Prior to any day, there is uncertainty on whether
that day is an event day. This uncertainty can be represented
by a Bernoulli random variable ωt with parameter Pt, where
ωt = 1 indicates that day t is an event day, and the probability
that day t is an event day is Pt. We assume that the random
variables ω1, . . . , ωT are independent. At the beginning of
each day, the customer is notified whether the current day
is an event day.
In each hour h, the customer has default electricity demand
dh and solar energy production ρh. The customer can charge
the battery by an amount of b+h ≥ 0 or discharge the battery
by an amount of b−h ≥ 0, resulting in an hourly net load
lh = dh + b
+
h − ρh − b−h .
Positive values of lh indicate that the customer purchases
energy from the grid during hour h, and negative values
indicate that the customer exports energy to the grid. The
values dh, ρh, bh, and lh are in the unit of kWh.
The battery scheduling variables b+h and b
−
h are constrained
by the physical characteristics of a battery system. A power
capacity constraint requires the total amount of energy charged
and discharged to be no larger than the rated power capacity
P of the battery system in all hours, namely
b+h + b
−
h ≤ P, ∀h ∈ {1, . . . ,H}. (1)
We denote the level of stored energy at each hour h by eh.
The dynamics of the stored energy can be written as
eh = eh−1 + b+h · η+ − b−h /η−, ∀h ∈ {2, . . . ,H}, (2)
where η+ ∈ (0, 1) is the battery charging efficiency and η− ∈
(0, 1) is the battery discharging efficiency. Finally, an energy
capacity constraint requires that the level of stored energy does
not exceed the rated energy capacity E of the battery system
in all hours, namely
0 ≤ eh ≤ E, ∀h ∈ {1, . . . ,H}. (3)
We define b+t = (b
+
ht−1+1, . . . , b
+
ht
) as the vector of battery
charging schedules in day t, and b−t = (b
−
ht−1+1, . . . , b
−
ht
) as
the vector of battery discharging schedules in day t.
B. Costs and Payments
The customer’s economic incentives consist of costs and
payments. The cost is the customer’s energy purchase cost.
For each hour when the net load is positive (i.e., lh > 0), the
customer incurs an energy purchase cost ch, calculated as
ch
(
b+h , b
−
h
)
= rch · lh = rch ·
(
dh + b
+
h − ρh − b−h
)
, (4)
where rch is the electricity purchase rate per kWh for hour h.
The payments come from energy export and the DR pro-
gram. For each hour when the net load is negative (i.e.,
lh < 0), the customer exports energy to the grid and receives
an energy export payment peh, calculated as
peh
(
b+h , b
−
h
)
= reh · (−lh) = reh ·
(−dh − b+h + ρh + b−h ) , (5)
where reh is the electricity export rate per kWh for hour h.
Additionally, the customer may receive DR energy pay-
ments or DR capacity payments or both via the demand
response program. Both types of DR payments are based on
the quantity of demand response energy reduction, which is
the difference between the true energy consumption and the
baseline energy consumption during the DR window. We write
Ht as the set of hours in the DR window of day t. Then the
true energy consumption during the DR window of day t,
denoted by st, is calculated as
st =
∑
h∈Ht
lh. (6)
At an event day t, the baseline consumption is calculated based
on the consumption during the DR windows of a number of
previous non-event days. We write T Bt as the set of non-
event days that affect the baseline in the event day t. Then
the baseline energy consumption in an event day t, denoted
by s¯Bt , is defined as
s¯Bt = f({sτ}τ∈T Bt ). (7)
Usually, the baseline is simply the average consumption during
the DR windows of relevant non-event days (e.g. [19]), namely
s¯Bt =
(∑
τ∈T Bt sτ
)
/
∣∣T Bt ∣∣ .
Given the true and baseline consumption, the DR energy
reduction in event day t, denoted by ∆t, can be calculated
as
∆t = s¯
B
t − st. (8)
Note that we allow the reduction to be negative, so the
customer could potentially pay a penalty for increasing the
demand, as in [19]. Other programs do not penalize the
customer for increasing the demand, in which case we will
have ∆t = max
{
0, s¯Bt − st
}
.
As in [20], the DR energy payment for each event day t,
denoted by pDRet , is calculated by
pDRet
(
b+1:t, b
−
1:t;ω1:t
)
= rDRet ·∆t, (9)
where rDRet is the DR payment rate per kWh for day t, b
+
1:t =
(b+1 , . . . , b
+
t ) and b
−
1:t = (b
−
1 , . . . , b
−
t ) are the battery charging
and discharging schedules from day 1 to day t, respectively,
and ω1:t = (ω1, . . . , ωt) is the sequence of event indicators
up to day t. The customer receives no DR energy payment on
non-event days.
Remark 1 (Inter-Temporal Dependence): The DR energy
payment for an event day t could depend on the battery
scheduling decisions in day 1, if for example, days 2 to t− 1
are all event days. We write pDRet
(
b+1:t, b
−
1:t;ω1:t
)
to explicitly
indicate the inter-temporal dependence of the payment on
the scheduling decisions. Strictly speaking, the DR energy
payment depends only on the hours in the DR windows of
previous days. But we use battery scheduling decisions of all
previous hours b+1:t and b
−
1:t to simplify notations.
Remark 2 (Randomness): In (9), we also make it clear that
the DR payment pDRet depends on the realization ω1:t of the
event days from day 1 to day t, and therefore is random. This
is because the set T Bt of non-event days that affect the baseline
in day t depends on ω1:t and is random. As a consequence,
all the quantities related to DR events, namely st, s¯Bt , ∆t, and
pDRet depend on ω1:t and are random.
Another type of DR payment is the DR capacity payment,
which is based on the average energy reduction per hour
during an interval of days (e.g., a month). We write the
set of event days in interval i as T Ei . Then the average
energy reduction per hour during interval i, denoted by ∆¯i, is
calculated as
∆¯i =
∑
t∈T Ei ∆t∑
t∈T Ei |Ht|
. (10)
As in [20], the DR capacity payment during interval i is then
pDRci
(
b+1:ti , b
−
1:ti
;ω1:ti
)
= rDRci · ∆¯i, (11)
where rDRci is the DR capacity payment rate for interval i,
and b+1:ti and b
−
1:ti
are the battery charging and discharging
schedules from day 1 to the final day ti of interval i, and
ω1:ti = (ω1, . . . , ωti) is the sequence of event indicators up
to the final day ti of interval i. Again in (11), we make
it clear that the DR capacity payment pDRci depends on
prior scheduling decisions and is random, as explained in
Remarks 1–2. If there is no DR event during interval i, we set
∆¯i = 0. Note that some DR programs do give DR capacity
payments (e.g., the prior interval’s amount) in the case of no
event.
C. Problem Formulation
We aim to minimize the customer’s expected total net cost
over a finite time horizon of I intervals (e.g., 12 months),
which consist of T days (e.g., 365 days), or equivalently, H =
24 · T hours (e.g., 8760 hours). The decision variables are
battery scheduling variables b+1:T and b
−
1:T during this time
horizon.
As shown in (9) and (11), the DR payments depend on
the realization of random event days. Therefore, the battery
schedules b+t and b
−
t in day t should also depend on the
previous and current realizations ω1:t of event days (but not
future realizations due to causality). To make this dependence
explicit, we write the battery schedules as functions of the
realizations, namely b+t (ω1:t) and b
−
t (ω1:t).
Given realizations of all events ω1:T , the total net cost is
C
({
b+t (ω1:t), b
−
t (ω1:t)
}T
t=1
;ω1:T
)
(12)
=
H∑
h=1
(ch − peh)−
I∑
i=1
pDRci
(
b+1:ti(ω1:t), b
−
1:ti
(ω1:t);ω1:ti
)
−
I∑
i=1
∑
t∈T Ei
pDRet
(
b+1:t(ω1:t), b
−
1:t(ω1:t);ω1:t
)
.
Our goal is to minimize the expectation of the above cost:
minimize Eω2:T
{
C
({
b+t (ω1:t), b
−
t (ω1:t)
}T
t=1
;ω1:T
)}
subject to: under each ω2:T ∈ {0, 1}T−1,
for t = 1, . . . , T and h = ht−1 + 1, . . . , ht :
b+h (ω1:t) + b
−
h (ω1:t) ≤ P,
eh(ω1:t) = eh−1(ω1:t) + b+h (ω1:t) · η+
− b−h (ω1:t)/η−,
0 ≤ eh(ω1:t) ≤ E,
variables: under each ω2:T ∈ {0, 1}T−1,
b+t (ω1:t) and b
−
t (ω1:t), t = 1, . . . , T. (13)
Note that the expectation is taken over the random event
schedules starting from day 2, namely ω2:T , instead of ω1:T .
In practice, a customer is notified whether the next day is an
event day at least a few hours ahead. Therefore, at the time of
solving the problem, we already know the realization of ω1.
The problem in (13) is a multi-stage stochastic decision
problem. The numbers of decision variables and constraints
are large and grow exponentially with the length of the time
horizon. More specifically, for each day t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, there
are 2t−1 different scenarios (i.e., different realizations of ω2:t),
and therefore 2t−1 different battery schedules b+t (ω1:t) and
b−t (ω1:t). So the total number of decision variables is
2 · 24 · (1 + 2 + · · ·+ 2T−1) = 48 · (2T − 1) .
For a one-year time horizon (i.e., T = 365), there are over
10111 decision variables. The number of constraints grow
exponentially with the time horizon in the same way. In
summary, it is impossible to obtain the exact solution to (13)
under any reasonable length of time horizon. In the next
section, we show how to obtain a near-optimal solution.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Since it is impractical to obtain the exact solution to
(13), we get near-optimal solutions by a multistage model
predictive control approach with a receding horizon of N
days, where N ≤ T . Specifically, for each day t, we solve
a stochastic program that minimizes the customer’s total cost
from day t to day t+N − 1, and obtain the battery schedules
{b+τ , b−τ }t+N−1τ=t . We use the decisions b+t , b−t for the day t
only. For the next day t + 1, we solve a stochastic program
that minimizes the cost from day t+ 1 to day t+N , in order
to get the schedules b+t+1, b
−
t+1. We repeat this process for
each day. The hypothesis behind this approach is that when
the receding horizon N is sufficiently large, the current day’s
action is less likely to affect the costs more than N days in
ωt:
ωt+1:
ωt+2:
ωt+3:
ωt+4:
1
0 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 10101010
perfect binary tree
of depth 2
sampled branch:
ω˜t+2:t+4(10)
sampled branch:
ω˜t+2:t+4(11)
Fig. 1. An example of the binary scenario tree. Day t is an event day, the
receding horizon is N = 5, all possible scenarios ωt:t+1 in the first n = 2
days are evaluated, and one scenario ω˜t+2:t+4(ωt:t+1) from day t + 2 to
day t+ 4 is sampled after each ωt:t+1.
the future. Therefore, the battery schedules obtained from the
stochastic program over the smaller time horizon of N days are
likely to be close to the optimal schedules. Since the receding
horizon (e.g., N = 30 days) can be much smaller than the
entire time horizon (e.g., T = 365 days), we solve a much
smaller problem than (13).
In addition to using a receding horizon of N days, we
further simplify the stochastic program by approximating the
objective function in (13) through sampling. The objective
function in (13) is the expected net cost, where the expectation
is taken over the random event schedules ω2:T . Such an
expectation is computed as the weighted sum of net costs in
2T−1 different scenarios, where each scenario is a realization
ω1:T . In the multistage model predictive control approach
outlined above, we limit the lookahead horizon to N days,
and take the expectation over the realization ωt+1:t+N−1 (we
already know ωt when solving the problem). Therefore, we
need to evaluate 2N−1 scenarios. Although we have N < T ,
the number of scenarios may still be large. This motivates us
to further reduce the number of scenarios to consider.
To better explain our approach, we can define a binary
scenario tree to represent the scenarios to evaluate. The root
indicates whether day t is an event day, and the two child
nodes of the root represent the two possibilities that day t+ 1
is an event day or a non-event day. In general, there are 2τ−1
nodes of depth τ ≥ 2, representing the possibilities of day
t + τ − 1 following the 2τ−2 scenarios ωt:t+τ−2 from day t
to day t+ τ − 2. We will have a perfect binary tree of depth
n ≤ N , in which all interior nodes have two children and all
leaves have the same depth. Then each leaf node of this n-level
perfect binary tree has one degenerate branch of depth N−n,
namely a branch in which all interior nodes have exactly one
child. Each degenerate branch corresponds to the selection of
one scenario out of 2N−n scenarios ωt+n:t+N−1 from day
t + n to day t + N − 1. We select the scenario by sampling
according to the probabilities that each scenario occurs, where
the probability of the scenario ωt+n:t+N−1 is
t+N−1∏
τ=t+n
(1− Pτ )1−ωτ (Pτ )ωτ (14)
To define the reformulated problem to solve, for each τ ≥
t + n, we write ω˜t+n:τ (ωt:t+n−1) as the sampled realization
of event days from day t + n to day τ given the realization
ωt:t+n−1 of event days from day t to day t+n− 1. We write
it as function of ωt:t+n−1, because we need to sample one
scenario after each ωt:t+n−1. In the scenario tree, the selected
ω˜t+n:t+N−1(ωt:t+n−1) is the degenerate branch spawning
from the leaf node of the branch ωt:t+n−1 in the perfect
binary tree of depth n. Note that ω˜t+n:t+N−1(ωt:t+n−1) is
random. For each τ ≥ t+ n, we write ω˜t:τ (ωt:t+n−1) as the
concatenation of ωt:t+n−1 and ω˜t+n:τ (ωt:t+n−1).
Based on the above notations, we can write the decision
variables in the multistage MPC problem as
under each ωt+1:t+n−1 ∈ {0, 1}n−1, (15)
for τ = t, . . . , t+ n− 1 :
b+τ (ωt:τ ), b
−
τ (ωt:τ ),
for τ = t+ n, . . . , t+N − 1 :
b+τ [ω˜t:τ (ωt:t+n−1)] , b
−
τ [ω˜t:τ (ωt:t+n−1)] .
In other words, we need to determine the battery schedules
under all possible scenarios from day t+ 1 to day t+ n− 1,
and the schedules under only sampled scenarios from day t+n
to day t+N − 1. Hence, we limit the number of variables to
2 · 24 · [1 + 2 + · · ·+ 2n−1 + 2n−1 · (N − n)]
= 48 · [2n−1 · (N − n+ 2)− 1] . (16)
We can see that the number of decision variables does not
depend on the full length T of the time horizon, and grows
linearly with the receding horizon N and exponentially with
n. We control the complexity of the MPC problem through n.
Next, we define the modified net cost over the receding
horizon. We write It as the set of intervals included in the
receding time horizon from day t to day t+N−1. For example,
if N = 20 and each interval is a month, then I1 = {1}
and I15 = {1, 2}. Dropping the dependence of the decision
variables on the scenarios for notational simplicity, we can
write the modified net cost as
C˜t
({
b+τ , b
−
τ
}t+N−1
τ=t
;ωt:t+n−1
)
(17)
=
ht+N−1∑
h=ht−1+1
(ch − peh)
−
∑
i∈It
p˜DRci
(
b+t:t+N−1, b
−
t:t+N−1;ωt:t+n−1
)
−
∑
i∈It
∑
τ∈T Ei ∩[t,t+N−1]
pDReτ
(
b+t:τ , b
−
t:τ ;ωt:t+n−1
)
,
where the energy purchase cost ch, the energy export payment
peh, and the DR energy payment p
DRe
τ remain the same as in
(12), but the DR capacity payment p˜DRci is the approximation
of the true DR capacity payment pDRci . In our MPC approach,
we may not be able to compute the true DR capacity payment,
because the receding horizon may end before the end of an
interval. Since we do not know the demand reduction in the
remaining days of this interval, we cannot compute the average
demand reduction in this interval and the true DR capacity
payment. In this case, we calculate the DR capacity payment
pDRci of interval i according to (11) over interval i’s days
before the end of the horizon, and then discount it by the
fraction of total days in the interval that are considered, namely
p˜DRci =
min{ti, t+N − 1} − ti−1
ti − ti−1 · p
DRc
i . (18)
We discount the DR capacity payment, because the tariff costs
and DR energy payments are calculated over a fraction of the
month, and we want to use a corresponding portion of the total
DR capacity payment over the month. If the receding horizon
starts after the start of an interval, we use stored values of
demand reductions in event days prior to the current receding
horizon.
Finally, it is worth to note that the modified cost
C˜t
(
{b+τ , b−τ }t+N−1τ=t ;ωt:t+n−1
)
is random, because we ran-
domly select the scenario ω˜t+n:t+N−1(ωt:t+n−1) after day
t+ n− 1.
Now we can formulate the problem to solve in our MPC
approach as follows.
min Eωt+1:t+n−1
{
C˜t
({
b+τ , b
−
τ
}t+N−1
τ=t
;ωt:t+n−1
)}
s.t. under each ωt+1:t+n−1 ∈ {0, 1}n−1,
for τ = t, . . . , t+ n− 1, and
h = hτ−1 + 1, . . . , hτ :
b+h (ωt:τ ) + b
−
h (ωt:τ ) ≤ P,
eh(ωt:τ ) = eh−1(ωt:τ ) + b+h (ωt:τ ) · η+
− b−h (ωt:τ )/η−,
0 ≤ eh(ωt:τ ) ≤ E,
for τ = t+ n, . . . , t+N − 1 and
h = hτ−1 + 1, . . . , hτ :
b+h [ω˜t:τ (ωt:t+n−1)] + b
−
h [ω˜t:τ (ωt:t+n−1)] ≤ P,
eh [ω˜t:τ (ωt:t+n−1)] = eh−1 [ω˜t:τ (ωt:t+n−1)]
+ b+h [ω˜t:τ (ωt:t+n−1)] · η+
− b−h [ω˜t:τ (ωt:t+n−1)] /η−,
0 ≤ eh [ω˜t:τ (ωt:t+n−1)] ≤ E,
variables: as defined in (15). (19)
Similar to (13), we take the expectation over the random
event schedules starting from day t+ 1, namely ωt+1:t+n−1,
because we already know the realization of ωt when solving
the problem for day t.
Remark 3 (Approximation and Randomness): Note that the
objective function and decision variables in the proposed
MPC approach (19) are different from those in the original
scheduling problem (13). For computational feasibility, we
reduce the number of decision variables by reducing the time
horizon and evaluating only selected scenarios, and make
necessary approximations in the cost function due to the
reduced time horizon. Therefore, the proposed solution (19)
is an approximation to the optimal solution to (13). We can
recover the optimal solution by setting the time horizon the
same as that in the original problem (i.e., N = T ) and
minimizing the exact expected cost (i.e., n = N ). Note also
that the objective function and the constraints in (19) are
random due to the randomly sampled ω˜t+n:t+N−1(ωt:t+n−1)
after each ωt:t+n−1 (even though we take the expectation
over ωt+1:t+n−1). Therefore, the solution, namely the bat-
tery schedules, is random and depends on which scenario
ω˜t+n:t+N−1(ωt:t+n−1) was sampled. In Section V-B, we
study the effect of random sampling numerically and find it to
be negligible for the cases we investigated. We will also study
the suboptimality introduced by limiting the time horizon to
N in the next section.
V. CASE STUDY
In this section, we apply the model and the solution in
Section III and Section IV to an example residential customer
participating in a tariff and DR program based on the existing
Customer Grid Supply Plus tariff [21] and the Capacity
Reduction Grid Service DR program [19]1.
We first study several cases whose time horizons are small
enough for us to compute the optimal solutions, and compare
our proposed solutions with the optimal solutions. Next, we
present numerical results for a case study with a full-year time
horizon, in order to identify customer incentives to increase
baseline energy consumption.
A. Basic Simulation Setup
We first describe the parameters that are common to all of
the cases.
1) Customer default electricity demand: The default cus-
tomer electricity demand is the base-case Honolulu residential
customer demand obtained from an OpenEI dataset [22],
which includes synthesized hourly load profiles for a typical
year’s weather corresponding to the Typical Meteorological
Year 3 (TMY3) dataset [23].
2) Solar photovoltaic energy production: The solar produc-
tion is obtained from PVWatts [24], based on a 9.5 kW rooftop
system with default parameters and the Honolulu TMY3
weather data. Using TMY3 data for both customer demand and
solar aligns their weather-based variations. The solar system
size was selected so that annual production roughly matches
annual customer demand.
3) Battery energy storage system: The customer’s battery
consists of two units of the Tesla Powerwall battery [25], a
popular residential battery system. The round-trip efficiency
is 90%. Assuming equal charging and discharging efficiency,
we have η+ = η− =
√
0.9. The total battery system power
capacity is 10 kW and energy capacity is 27 kWh. The battery
energy capacity was selected to be similar to the customer’s
daily energy demand.
4) Customer tariff: The customer receives $0.108/kWh for
energy exported to the grid, and the customer pays $0.29/kWh
to purchase energy from the grid. The difference between the
export rate and the purchase rate incentivizes charging the
battery when solar production exceeds load, and discharging
that energy later to reduce grid purchases.
1This case study simplifies some elements of the Customer Grid Supply
Plus tariff and the Capacity Reduction grid service, but aims to represent the
major elements that could lead to incentives to game baselines. For example,
Capacity Reduction includes separate payments to aggregators and customers,
but this study considers that the aggregator and customers act as one entity.
Interested readers can refer to the program documents for more information.
5) DR program details: The customer receives a DR ca-
pacity payment based on average load reduction during DR
events each month. The DR window is from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m.
in all event days. Baseline energy consumption is the average
energy consumption during the DR windows of some number
of previous non-event days.
6) Probabilities of DR events: The probabilities of a DR
event occurring each day were calculated based on a logistic
regression of occurrence of a DR event versus daily peak
temperature. The logistic regression model was created based
on 2017 Hawaiian Electric system electricity demand [26] and
2017 weather data for Honolulu [27]. Capacity Reduction DR
events can be called up to 104 times per year [19], so event
days were assigned to the 104 days of 2017 with the highest
peak hourly electricity demand. A logistic regression model
of DR event occurrence versus daily peak temperature was
used to calculate daily event probabilities for Honolulu TMY3
weather.
7) Initial values: For the first day, the initial battery state
of charge is set to 50% of the battery energy capacity, and the
initial baseline is set to all zeros.
B. Assessing The Quality of Proposed Solutions
As explained in Remark 3, our proposed solution is an ap-
proximation to the optimal solution, and is random. Therefore,
it is important to assess its performance in terms of the cost
and its variance. To compare with the optimal solution, we
need to restrict to cases whose time horizons are small enough
so that it is feasible to compute the optimal solution.
We consider a time horizon of T = 7 days, which is long
enough to show multi-day effects, and short enough to allow
computing the optimal solution. Due to the small number of
days in these cases, we use a 3-day baseline (i.e., the baseline
consumption is the average of previous 3 non-event days),
which is shorter than the standard 10-day baseline in Capacity
Reduction. We consider two periods of 7 days: the first 7 days
in January (low temperature and low probabilities of events)
and the first 7 days in October (high temperature and high
probabilities of events). We set the rate rDRci of DR capacity
payments to be $2/kW (the minimum customer incentive level
allowed for Capacity Reduction grid service [19]), and use the
per-hour demand reduction averaged over the 7 days, instead
of over the entire month, to determine DR capacity payments.
Table I presents the results for the 7-day case study in
January and October. The table shows customer cost and
demand response quantity, as expected values over the random
event schedules ω1:7. Additional metrics baseline load (i.e.,
average baseline load over all events in kW) and event load
(i.e., average load over all events in kW) were also calculated.
We first show the metrics under the optimal solution, which
is obtained by setting N = n = 7. Then we evaluate our
proposed solution under different receding horizons of N = 4
and N = 2 without sampling (i.e., n = N in both cases).
In these two cases with n = N , we optimize the expected
cost over all event schedules ωt:t+N−1, which results in
deterministic solutions. In this way, we can focus on the impact
of a shorter receding horizon. We can see that under the 4-day
receding horizon, customer cost nearly matches the optimal
cost, and under the 2-day receding horizon, customer cost is
about 3% higher than the optimal cost. This suggests that a
shorter receding horizon can provide close to optimal results.
As we would expect, the performance tends to improve with
the length of the receding horizon.
Next we focus on the impact of sampling the scenario tree.
We set the receding horizon as the entire time horizon (i.e.,
N = T = 7), consider all the possible scenarios in the first 2
days (i.e., n = 2), and sample one event schedule from day 3
to day 7. In this case, the proposed solution depends on the
sampled event schedule ω˜3:7, and therefore, is random. We
run the simulations 5 times to get 5 battery schedules under
different sampled event schedules, and show the mean and
the standard deviation of the performance metrics over these
5 runs. We can see that the customer cost is within 1% of the
optimum with small standard deviation.
Finally, we set N = 4 and n = 2 to evaluate the
proposed solution with both a shorter receding horizon and
sampled event schedules. Again, since the proposed approach
yields different battery schedules under different sampled
event schedules, we show the average metrics and standard
deviations over 5 runs. The customer cost is within 1% of the
optimum with small standard deviation.
Comparing the cases of (N,n) = (7, 2) and (N,n) = (4, 2)
with the case of (N,n) = (2, 2), we can see that under
the same depth of the perfect binary tree (i.e., n = 2), we
can improve the performance (i.e., from about 3% within
the optimum to within 1% from the optimum) by sampling
additional days (i.e., 5 additional days when N = 7 and 2
additional days when N = 4).
Compared to customer cost, the DR quantity metric tends
to show greater percentage differences from the optimal case.
However, the values are still reasonably close to the optimal
case in absolute magnitude and have reasonably small standard
deviations. This finding also holds for the baseline load and
event load metrics.
Our conclusion from this study is that it is possible to
significantly reduce the number of scenarios considered in the
scenario tree and still obtain near-optimal results. We thus use
our proposed approach in the full-year study, where calculating
the optimal solution is not feasible.
C. Evaluating Customer Incentives
We study the battery scheduling problem with a time
horizon of a full year (i.e., T = 365). In the proposed solution,
we choose a receding horizon of N = 35 (longer than a full
month, over which the DR capacity payment is calculated)
and a depth n = 4 of the perfect binary scenario tree (based
on results in Table I). We consider two DR capacity payment
rates of $2/kW and $10/kW.
We also create a “counter-factual” case, as a control group,
where the customer does not participate in the DR program. In
this case the objective is to minimize net tariff costs (i.e., costs
of energy purchase from the grid minus rebates for exports).
The stochastic parameters representing event schedule do not
impact this cost, so the optimal decisions for this case can be
TABLE I
APPROXIMATION STUDY RESULTS
TABLE II
FULL-YEAR RESULTS
solved in a single scenario. However, in the counter-factual
case, there are many different solutions that yield the same
optimal cost with varying levels of electricity consumption
during DR windows. In order to compare event and baseline
load between the DR cases and the counter-factual case,
we need to select one from multiple optimal solutions. For
this study, we selected the optimal battery dispatch schedule
that charges the battery as much as possible to absorb solar
energy that exceeds load, and discharges the battery as much
as possible to avoid purchasing power from the grid. This
schedule was selected because it is a realistic and simple
algorithm to implement on batteries that are deployed today,
and thus represents a plausible counter-factual case.
Table II shows results for the cases with $2/kW-month
and $10/kW-month DR capacity payments. In addition to
the metrics shown, we also calculated average baseline load
and event load. Since the proposed approach yields stochastic
solutions that depend on the sampled schedules, we run the
experiments 10 times to get the mean values of the metrics. For
these cases we calculate the baseline inflation (the difference
between baseline load with DR payments and baseline load
in the case with no DR payment), and use this to calculate
“Baseline Inflation (% of DR),” which shows the portion
of apparent DR load reduction is actually due to baseline
inflation.
In the “counter-factual” case with no DR payments, average
baseline load and event load for the year are both approxi-
mately 0.1 kW, and average DR quantity is approximately 0.0
kW. This reflects that when the battery is used to minimize
tariff costs via our heuristic, the battery covers most of the
load during the DR windows of 5 p.m. to 9 p.m.. There is not
a significant difference in DR window energy consumption
between event and non-event days.
The $2/kW-month case shows higher baseline load (1.1 kW)
and lower event load (-0.4 kW). This indicates that while the
DR program does incentivize the customer to reduce load
during events, it also incentivizes even greater increases in
energy consumption during DR windows of non-event days.
Over the year, 66% of the apparent DR is due to baseline
inflation, with monthly values ranging from 3% in January to
94% in October.
The $2/kW-month case also indicates that even at the
minimum payment level, the Capacity Reduction grid service
successfully provides an incentive for the customer to modify
battery charging to deliver DR. Comparing the quantity of
average DR (1.5 kW) to the size of the battery system (10
kW, 27 kWh), we see that the quantity of DR is much smaller
than what could be obtained if the battery was solely focused
on delivering DR. This reflects that at this relatively low
DR payment level, the battery often prioritizes the high-value
application of shifting solar production to reduce tariff costs.
The $10/kW-month case shows even higher baseline load
(4.8 kW) and lower event load (-1.7 kW), indicating stronger
incentives to reduce load during events and increase load
during DR windows of non-event days. Over the year, 73%
of the apparent DR is due to baseline inflation, with monthly
values ranging from 19% in January and March to 97% in
October. While the overall trend was to increase the percentage
of baseline inflation compared to the $2/kW-month case, in
some months (May, September, November) the percentage of
baseline inflation was lower. This is because the relationship
between DR payment and strength of incentives to lower
event load and increase baseline load can vary based on
monthly parameters including event probabilities, customer
default demand, and solar energy production.
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